Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to carry out a comparative analysis of the intergenerational mobility regimes exhibited by two Western societies in the middle of the 1980s: Italy and the United States. To this aim I will analyse four intergenerational mobility tables that cross-classify Italian and US men and women aged 23-65 according to their father's occupational class (the origin) and their own occupational class (the destination).1 The data used in this paper come from two different sources. The Italian data are drawn from the Indagine naTionale sulla mobilita sociale (National Survey on Social Mobility), carried out in 1985 by a pool of Italian universities (Barbagli etal., 1986) . In turn, the US data come from the GeneralSocialSurvey Smith, 1989a, 1989b To represent the class structure, I will use a schema made up of ten different occupational classes: (1) Entrepreneurs: this class includes all the owners of means of production who have at least four employees, regardless of their sector of activity; (2) Professionals: this class includes self-employed or salaried higher-grade professionals, scientists, artists, and athletes; (3) Managers: this class includes managers and administrators in private or public firms and organizations; (4) Skilled white-collar: this class includes higher-grade office and commerce employees, as well as semi-professionals and higher-grade technicians; (5) Semi-and unskilled whitecollar: this class includes lower-grade office and commerce employees; (6) Urbanpetty bourgeoisie: this class includes the small proprietors, mainly artisans and store owners, who have less than four employees or no employees at all, and whose sector of activity is neither agriculture, forestry, nor fishery; (7) Skilled workers: this class includes supervisors and skilled manual workers employed in the service sector or in the sectors traditionally associated with the Fordist system of mass production and consumption (mining, manufacturing, distribution, construction), as well as security workers; (8) Semi-and unskilledworkers: this class includes lower-grade manual workers employed in the service sector or in the sectors traditionally associated with the Fordist system of mass production and consumption (see above); (9) ,Mgricultural petty bourgeoisie: this class includes the small proprietors, mainly farmers, who have less than four employees or no employees at all, and whose sector of activity is agriculture, forestr;y or fishery; (10) Agricultural workers: this class includes salaried manual workers in the agricultural, forestry, or fishery sectors.
In the next section I propose a theoretical model for the explanation of mobility regimes in terms of underlying generative mechanisms. In the third section such a model is operationalized and translated into a proper statistical model, namely a hybrid loglinear model for frequencies. This model is then fitted to the pertinent mobility tables to verify whether (a) the observed data offer evidence in favour of the existence of the hypothesized mechanisms; and (b) cross-sex and/or cross-national dissimilarities in the action of such mechanisms do exist. The fourth section is dedicated to the interpretation of results and, finally, the last section is devoted to some concluding remarks.
Explaining Mobility Regimes: A Theoretical Model
In this paper I will adopt an explanatory strategy to which, following Pawson (1989: 160) , I will refer as generative modelling. The basic claim of this strategy is that, in the investigation of a given social phenomenon, the identification of regular, non-spurious relationships between the variables of interest is an important descriptive operation but lacks any explanatory power. Hence, this preliminary operation must be supplemented by the formulation of models that make explicit hypotheses about the underlying mechanisms that have generated the social phenomenon under study, empirically represented by the observed data (Pawson, 1989 (Pawson, : 157-159, 1993 : 31-33; see also Boudon, 1973; Elster, 1983a Elster, : 25-26, 1989 : ch. 1, 1993: 1-15; Little, 1991: 6-9, ch. 2). A fuller account of the type of explanatory strategy which underlies this paper is given in a series of writings by Boudon (1977 Boudon ( ,1979 Boudon ( ,1984 Boudon ( ,1986 Boudon ( ,1987 .
In short, let M indicate the macrosocial phenomenon to be explained. The first step is to regard M as the outcome of the combination of a set of individual actions m carried out by intentional actors.
Formally, M=M(m)
, that is M is a function of the individual actions m. In turn, the actions m must be explained or, to use Boudon's words, must be made understandable in the Weberian sense. To this aim, one must recognize that actors are always embedded in a social context, i.e. they always occupy a social position characterized by a given system of resources and constraints that condition their action. Thus, to be understood, the individual actions m must be related to the social environment S where the actors are located. Formally, m=m(S), that is each action m is a function of the actor's social position S. Finally, S must be explained in terms of a set P of macrofeatures of the social system within which M has emerged. Again, formally S=S(P). On the whole, AM=M{m[S(P)]} or, more simply, M=MmSP. In words,'M is the outcome of actions, which are the outcome of the social environment of the actors, the latter being the outcome of macrosociological variables' (Boudon, 1987: 46) . In the rest of this section I will devise a theoretical model for the explanation of mobility regimes that takes the form M=MmSP; moreover, since the interpretation of intentional actions requires that some model of the actor be assumed (cf. Boudon, 1984: ch. 2,1987: 55), I will postulate that individuals are, on the whole, rational.
Let us begin with the function M=M(m). In the present case M represents the mobility regime3 that characterizes a given society -or sub-population -in a given period, while the actions m correspond to the individual movements carried out within the class structure during that period.
Since all the individual movements characterized by the same origin and the same destination are regarded as homogeneous, we can aggregate individual actions and write M = M(mij), where i indexes the class of origin andj indexes the class of destination. By so doing, we shift our attention from the actual movements m carried out by unique individuals to the propensities for mobility mij that characterize the members of each class of origin taken as a whole. In other words, the mobility regime M is seen as a function of the propensities that the members of the various origin classes have for moving to the different destinations available in the system.4 In turn, the mobility propensities mil can be regarded as a function of both the class of origin Oi, which represents the social environment where the action takes place, and the class of destination Dj, that is the goal towards which the action is aimed; formally, mij = mij (Oi, Dj). Finally, if (Oi, Dj) is taken to represent the class structure, then P can be seen as the system of social stratification, that is the set of factors that structure inequality within the social system; formally, (Oi, Dj) =f(P).
Essentially, this function implies that the different classes provide their members with unequal systems of resources and constraints.
By taking into account class inequality -i.e. the function (Oi, Dj) = f(P) -we are able to clarify the mechanisms that shape actors' mobility propensities and, ultimately, generate the observed mobility regime. The first step towards such a clarification is to modify the form of function mij = mij (0i, Dj). More precisely, I will translate the configuration of the class structure (Oi, Dj) into four basic elements: (a) the amount ofgeneralresources Pi that characterizes class of origin Oi; (b) the amount of destination-specific resources p;j that characterizes class of origin Oi with respect to class of destination Dj; (c) the degree of objective desirability by that characterizes class of destination D>; and (d) the degree ofpreference 6ij for class of destination Dj that characterizes class of origin Oi. The meaning of each element can be clarified as follows.
1. The first two elements represent class inequality, that is the fact that different classes provide their members with unequal amounts -and kinds -of resources. If we regard the various occupational destinations as the 'commodities' to buy and resources as the 'currency unit', it is easy to see that the amount of resources available to individuals determines their 'buying power' and, ultimately, their mobility propensities (cf. below). In this regard, a distinction is made between the general resources pi, which can be used to 'buy' any occupational destination, and the destination-specific resources piR, which, by contrast, can be spent only to acquire particular destinations.5 Both general and destination-specific resources are regarded as having an objective character, that is as expressing the factual system of resources and constraints with which the members of the different classes are endowed.6 2. The third element concerns the objective desirability of the different occupational destinations, i.e. the benefits each class effectively grants to its members. The underlying assumptions here, are four: (a) the objective desirability of classes is defined in terms of the general resources they provide for their members; (b) the degree of objective desirability attributed to a given class exactly reflects the amount of general resources that characterizes the class itself; (c) the higher the degree of objective desirability attributed to a given class position, the higher the 'price'one must pay to occupy it; and (d) the degree of objective desirability attributed to any given occupational destination is the same across different origins. 3. Finally, while the third element implies an objective -and, therefore, origin-blind -evaluation of the 'goodness' of the different destinations, the fourth acknowledges that actors' preferences for the various destinations may be 'socially shaped' by origin-specific norms, values, dispositions, attitudes, etc. (cf. Boudon, 1973; Elster, 1983a Elster, , 1983b Elster, , 1989 Elster, , 1993 .7 Given these specifications, we can amend the form of the function that relates mobility propensities to the class structure as follows: mij = mrij(Pi, Pij, 6(, (i). In words, the propensity for moving from origin Oi to destination D, is a function of the amount of origin-specific general resources pi, the amount of origin-specific and destination-specific resources Pij, the degree of destination-specific objective desirability bj, and the degree of origin-specific and destination-specific preference 6,i. What are the generative mechanisms implied by this function? In short, each actor's resources (Pi, Pij) and preferences (bj, 6ij) determine the costs and benefits he or she attributes to each possible movement in the class structure; in turn, these costs and benefits affect the actor's propensities for moving to the different destinations. In general, the larger the amount of resources available, the lower the relative cost of -and, therefore, the higher the propensity for -moving to any given position. On the other hand, the higher the desirability attached to a given destination, the higher the perceived benefits of -and, thus, the propensity for -moving to it.
In summary, the generative mechanisms underlying any given mobility regime can be represented by the following model: In ( The larger the value taken on by this parameter, the larger the 'vertical distance' between any two origin classes in terms of general 'buying power'and therefore, ceteris paribus, the higher the degree of class inequality in terms of mobility chances. 3. As is well known, the cells that, in a mobility table, represent social immobility -i.e. the cells that lie on the main diagonal -typically display large frequencies, meaning that individuals' propensity to remain in the same class position as their father tends to be relatively high. The SEI term presented above helps to account for immobility by means of a very elementary mechanism: the higher the degree of objective desirability attributed to a given class, the higher the propensity to remain in that class. However, this mechanism is not sufficient to account for all the immobility observed. The term AGRI represents, at the same time, the 'affinity' between the two rural classes (farmers and agricultural workers) and the 'disaffinity' between the agricultural working class and all the classes based on white-collar occupations (professionals, managers, skilled and unskilled white-collar workers). These affinities and disaffinities should be interpreted as reflecting the effects of both destination-specific resources and origin-specific preferences. Specifically, the affinity between the two rural classes may be attributed to the fact that they both pertain to the agricultural sector. Therefore (a) children of farmers are likely to possess resources -both skills and social resources -that, ceterisparibus, facilitate their access to the agricultural working class; and (b) likewise, sons and daughters of agricultural workers are likely to possess resources that, ceterisparibus, facilitate their access to the agricultural petty bourgeoisie. In turn, the disaffinity between the agricultural working class, on the one hand, and the white-collar classes on the other may be conceived of as a consequence of the great 'distance' -in terms of both social resources and origin-specific preferences -that separates rural manual workers from urban non-manual workers. Put differently, the movements between these two groups of classes may be regarded as particularly difficult to carry out because they involve the crossing of two social boundaries: one that separates urban from rural society, and another that divides manual and non-manual work.
By constructing specific hypotheses about the generative mechanisms that are presumed to underlie the intergenerational mobility regimes observed in the four sub-populations under study, the model illustrated just now suggests a possible answer to our first research question (see above). But how does it deal with the comparative question? Strictly speaking, the model represents only the mechanisms that operate at the micro level, since it establishes a given set of relationships between the actors' resources and preferences and their mobility propensities. In this respect, the basic assumption is that the proposed model is valid for Italian and US men and women alike.15 Such a similarity, however, does not necessarily hold at the macro level; that is, the intensity with which one or more mechanisms operate may vary across sub-populations due to cultural and/or institutional differences.
Let us consider, for example, the role played by general resources.16 As mentioned above, the value taken on by the association parameter 'EI can be regarded as expressing the action of a set of macromechanisms that adjust the 'exchange value' of general resources. Such macromechanisms can be explicitly identified and related to three important institutions: the educational system, the labour market, and the family structure. In brief, the structure of the educational system affects individuals'chances of converting the general resources they derive from their family of origin into personal educational resources that, in general, represent a 'hard currency' when it comes to 'buying' occupational destinations. The characteristics of the educational system, along with those of the labour market, also affect the actual exchange value of such educational resources -i.e. the socioeconomic return to education. Finally, the structure of the family system influences individuals'chances of drawing resources from their family of origin -mainly economic and social resources -over and above those spent to acquire educational credentials. The limited number of sub-populations involved in our comparative analysis does not allow the formal inclusion of all these macromechanisms in the explanatory model.17 The only way to tackle the comparative question, then is (a) to test for the existence of cross-sex and/or cross-national differences in the values taken on by the parameters included in the log-linear model; and (b) to attribute the observed dissimilarities to the different ways in which the relevant macromechanisms operate in the sub-populations under study. In this regard, the cross-national differences that are most likely to be relevant to the present analysis can be summarized as follows.
1. The degree of class inequality in terms of educational opportunities is higher in Italy than in the United States (Shavit and Blossfeld, 1993) . This means that US men and women can convert their family resources into personal educational resources at a more favourable 'exchange rate' than their Italian counterparts.
2. Overall, the net association between education and occupational destination is stronger in Italy than in the United States (Shavit and Mtiller, 1995) . In other words, the exchange value of personal educational resources is higher in Italy than in the USA. 3. In the United States, the possession of a higher education substantially mitigates the direct effect of social origin on mobility chances (Hout, 1988) ; on the contrary, in Italy such an effect does not vary across educational levels (Cobalti and Schizzerotto, 1994 ). This evidence suggests that family resources exert a more pervasive and persistent influence in Italy than in the United States, probably due to the fact that in the former country the ties between parents and children tend to be stronger and more
enduring (cf. Cavalli and De Lillo, 1993).18
On the basis of these observations, it is reasonable to expect that the exchange value of resourcesand, therefore, the overall degree of class inequality in terms of mobility chances -will be higher in Italy than in the United States. On the other hand, insofar as the cross-sex comparison is concerned, neither theory nor previous research allows us to formulate firm expectations of any kind. Table 1 Table 1 , the fit of the conditional independence model is clearly unsatisfactory, suggesting that origin and destination are not independent. Model 2 incorporates this suggestion, specifying that (a) there is a certain degree of association between origin and destination; (b) this association takes the form specified in equation 1 above; and (c) the action of the mechanisms responsible for the observed pattern of association between origin and destination does not vary across sub-populations. As shown in Table 1 , this model has a much better fit than the previous one; moreover, the goodnessof-fit statistics pertaining to Models 3 to 8 indicate that all the generative mechanisms embodied in Model 2 exert a significant effect on mobility propensities. Therefore, Model 2 can be taken as a baseline to test for the existence of cross-sex and/or cross-national differences in social fluidity. Table 2 reports the results of these tests. As we can see, Models 2 to 13 add the twelve possible secondorder interaction effects -one at a time -to the baseline model, whereas Models 15 to 26 remove such effects -still one at a time -from a model that includes all the possible cross-sex and crossnational differences (Model 14). The goodness-offit statistics pertaining to these models suggest that Model 27 is a plausible candidate for the position of 'preferred model' Yet, the Bayesian information criterion ( Table 3 .20 In the first place, we can see that the posterior probability for Model 31 is very low (6 per cent), whereas Models 29 and 32 turn out to be almost equally likely (46 and 48 per cent respectively). Since the posterior probability that the parameter IMMB.C takes on a value different from zero is also very low (6 per cent), we can reasonably conclude that the intensity with which the basic propensity for immobility manifests itself does not vary significantly across countries. On the other hand, the posterior probability that the parameter IMMP.C takes on a value different from zero is very high (94 per cent) and, therefore, indicates that the effect of capital inheritance on immobility propensities does vary crossnationally. Things are less definite in the case of the parameter IMMP.S. The posterior probability that there exists a cross-sex difference in the effect of capital inheritance on immobility propensities is about one half (52 per cent) and, therefore, does not help us to resolve the uncertainty. However, since the Bayesian estimate of this parameter is consistent with the findings of previous research (see above), I will assume that this cross-sex difference is real. Hence, Model 29 can be regarded as the preferred model.21
Model Testing
The Bayesian parameter estimates and the corresponding standard errors for the preferred model are reported in Table 3 .22 As we can see, such estimates are very close to their maximum-likelihood counterparts (cf. Table 4 ). The former, however, take account of model uncertainty and have proved to yield better out-of-sample prediction than any single model that might reasonably be selected (Raftery, 1995) . These parameter estimates will be used in the next section to carry out a more detailed analysis of the mobility propensities exhibited by Italian and US men and women. general resources available to the various origin classes decreases (cf. note 12) and, consequently, the competitive advantage enjoyed by the offspring of professionals over their antagonists for accessing the more desirable destination increases.27
The second example is identical to the previous one, except that it refers to the United States. As we can see, in this case the slope of the relevant line is less steep than before, meaning that in this country the degree of class inequality in terms of mobility propensities is smaller. This is a consequence of the fact that the 'exchange value' of general resourcesrepresented by the association parameter CSE_ turns out to be smaller in the United States than in Italy (cf. below).
Finally, the third example refers again to Italy but it portrays the competitive advantage that the sons and daughters of professionals have over the individuals originating from all the other classes for becoming a professional rather than a manager. In this case, the relevant line shows a very moderate slope because the two alternative destinations are not very dissimilar in terms of degree of objective desirability (76.9 and 65.4 respectively).
If we now shift our attention to the comparison between mobility regimes, first we can observe that the information reported in Table 5 The sources of these dissimilarities are highlighted in Table 6 , which reports -for each of the four sub-populations under study -the log-linear effects exerted by the different generative mechanisms on mobility propensities. As we can see, there is a single source of cross-sex variation (i.e. the parameter yIIMP) and two sources of cross-national variation (i.e. the parameters SSEI and ylMMP). Conversely, the effects related to the two rural classes 
Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this paper was to carry out a comparative analysis of the intergenerational mobility regimes observed in Italy and the United States in the middle of the 1980s. To this end I have proposed a theoretical model according to which mobility propensities of individuals are a function of both the amount of resources (general and destination-specific) with which they are endowed and the degree of desirability (objective and subjective) they attribute to the different occupational destinations at stake. Such a model has been operationalized, translated into a hybrid log-linear model for frequencies, and fitted to the pertinent mobility tables.
The analysis has shown that the proposed model offers a plausible account of the mobility regimes observed in all four sub-populations under study. At the micro-level, there is enough evidence to maintain that, on the whole, the same mechanisms underlie the mobility propensities exhibited by Italian and US men and women. Particularly, general resources and objective desirability of classes appear to play the most prominent role in the structuring of mobility propensities.
However, the analysis has also shown that the intensity with which some mechanisms operate depends much on the institutional and cultural context in which actors are embedded. In this regard, it has been shown that while cross-sex differences are very modest, cross-national dissimilarities are quite pronounced. Expressly, the overall degree of class inequality in terms of mobility propensities -or chances -is considerably higher in Italy than in the United States, due to the higher 'exchange value' of general resources and family's business. It has been argued that such a dissimilarity stems from three main sources: ., 1982) . Consequently, in the analyses that follow the distributions of origins and destinations will be treated as exogenous components of the model. 4. In the literature on social mobility, it is common practice to talk of 'chances of moving' rather than of 'propensities for moving'. It seems to me that the first expression is more likely to evoke the constraints on action, whereas the second puts more emphasis on the fact that actors choose among different options. At any rate, in this context both terms denote the same concept; therefore, throughout this paper they will be used interchangeably. Also, it should be borne in mind that, given the definition of the explanandum, the mobility propensities -or chances -in question are considered net of the effects exerted by the distributions of origins and destinations (cf. n. 3). 5. A similar distinction between general and specific resources for mobility has been made by Yamaguchi (1983: 719-720). 6. It is opportune to point out that the system of resources attributed to each class should be regarded as an average -or macro -property of the class itself.
7. As in the case of resources, the system of preferences attributed to each class should be regarded as an average property of the class itself. 8. As Goldthorpe (1985, 1992 
